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FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE:  
IRCA’S NEGATIVE IMPACT  
ON LAW-ABIDING EMPLOYERS 
Joseph D. Layne* 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) made it 
illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers, and it shifted the 
responsibility and power of enforcement to employers’ hands. Because 
employers are ultimately concerned about their bottom-line profit 
margins, IRCA has created an inherent conflict of interest that 
incentivizes unscrupulous employers to take advantage of 
undocumented workers because, by doing so, the employers realize 
significant savings in the form of lower wages. In addition, recent 
judicial decisions have limited employers’ liability for violating federal 
labor laws, which has resulted in an overall dilution of undocumented 
workers’ labor-law rights. In short, unscrupulous employers are subject 
to less labor-law liability by hiring undocumented workers. This Article 
argues that Congress should repeal IRCA and take enforcement power 
out of employers’ hands, thereby restoring all employers to a level 
playing field. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Employer A is a “law-abiding” employer in the construction 
industry.1 Pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA),2 Employer A verifies that each of its employees 
possesses the necessary documentation to legally work in the United 
States.3 Employer A also complies with all minimum wage, overtime 
pay, and tax requirements. Recently, Employer A’s employees 
decided to form a union. As required by the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA),4 Employer A does not interfere with their efforts to 
form a union.5 As a result of the unionization of its employees, 
Employer A’s labor costs will significantly increase.6 To continue to 
compete in the marketplace, Employer A will have to either lower its 
profit margin or increase its prices to pass along the additional labor 
costs to its customers. 
Employer B, who competes directly with Employer A, is an 
“unscrupulous” employer. Hoping to gain a competitive advantage 
by any means possible, Employer B purposefully seeks out and hires 
only undocumented workers, in direct violation of IRCA.7 Employer 
B pays most of its employees less than minimum wage and never 
pays them overtime. If an employee confronts Employer B and 
complains about wage violations, Employer B threatens to call 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the administrative 
 
 1. For the purposes of this Article there are two types of employers, “law-abiding” 
employers and “unscrupulous” employers. In essence, law-abiding employers are those 
employers who seek to properly enforce IRCA and comply with the documentation requirements 
contained therein. Contrastingly, unscrupulous employers are employers who knowingly or 
purposefully underenforce or choose not to enforce IRCA or any of its documentation 
requirements. Also, unscrupulous employers seek to gain a competitive advantage over their law-
abiding counterparts by seeking out and exploiting undocumented workers. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)). 
 3. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006). 
 5. Id. § 158(a)(2). 
 6. In the private sector, as of the end of 2010, unionized workers in the construction 
industry earn 51.9 percent more than nonunionized construction workers earn. See Union Member 
Summary, BUREAU LAB. STAT. NEWS RELEASE (U.S. Dep’t of Labor, D.C.) Jan. 21, 2011, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. Moreover, this does not take into 
account Employer A’s increased Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) tax burden as a 
result of higher wages. 
 7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a). 
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agency in charge of overseeing employer enforcement of IRCA, to 
have the employee deported.8 Also, Employer B terminates any 
employee who engages in union-organizing activities. By exploiting 
its employees, Employer B substantially decreases its labor costs. 
This, in turn, increases its profits and allows Employer B to invest in 
other areas, such as advertising and market expansion, as well as 
outbid Employer A for employment contracts. 
This Article argues that IRCA’s employer-enforced immigration 
policies have placed law-abiding employers at a competitive 
disadvantage to unscrupulous employers for two reasons. First, by 
making it illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers, IRCA 
has had a diluting effect on undocumented workers’ labor-law rights. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that undocumented workers cannot 
collect back pay—the only monetary remedy available under the 
NLRA9—as a remedy for an employer’s violation of the NLRA.10 In 
addition, IRCA has had a chilling effect on undocumented workers 
exercising their existing labor-law rights because they fear exposure 
to immigration authorities. Thus, IRCA gives unscrupulous 
employers an incentive to hire undocumented workers because, by 
doing so, the employers realize significant savings not only in the 
form of lower wages but also in the form of diminished labor-law 
liability. Second, the government’s history of inconsistent 
application and under-enforcement of IRCA fails to disincentivize 
unscrupulous employers from hiring undocumented workers. 
Because unscrupulous employers face little risk of sanctions under 
IRCA, they are essentially permitted to hire and take advantage of 
undocumented workers by paying the employees wages below what 
is lawfully required. This creates a competitive advantage for 
unscrupulous employers by allowing them to pay lower labor costs 
than they would pay if they employed documented workers. 
 
 8. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT 16–17 (2008), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-
report/2008annual-report.pdf. 
 9. Hoffman Plastic Decision: Bad for Workers; Bad for Business, NAT’L IMMIGRATION 
LAW CTR. 1 (Mar. 2003), http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/Hoffman_NLRB/Hoffman_ 
TPs.PDF. 
 10. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 151 
(2002). 
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While Congress initially believed sanctions would ensure 
employer compliance with IRCA,11 this aspiration has never been, 
and is currently far from becoming, a reality. Congress must 
recognize that employer-enforced immigration law negatively affects 
law-abiding employers and take enforcement power out of 
employers’ hands completely. This Article suggests legal reform that 
restores all employers to a level playing field, thus removing any 
competitive advantage unscrupulous employers have obtained by 
exploiting undocumented workers. 
Part II of this Article explains the current state of employer-
enforced immigration law, focusing on IRCA and its enforcement 
history, other statutes that regulate employment, and case law. Part 
III argues that IRCA has a diluting effect on undocumented workers’ 
labor-law rights, in the context of not only the NLRA but also other 
labor laws. Part IV shows that the government’s under-enforcement 
of IRCA allows unscrupulous employers to flout immigration laws 
while they face little threat of meaningful consequences. Part V 
suggests that to remove the competitive advantage, Congress should 
repeal IRCA and grant equal employment rights to all workers, 
regardless of documentation status. This part also explores the costs 
and benefits of such action. Finally, Part VI concludes that while 
increasing enforcement is a possibility, ultimately, employer-
enforced immigration law is counterproductive to our economic 
principles and immigration policy. 
II.  ORIGIN OF A  
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE 
Although business is inherently competitive, fundamental 
principles of business ethics dictate that all businesses should 
compete on a level playing field.12 This notion seeks to prevent 
employers from gaining unfair advantages over their competitors.13 
 
 11. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt.1, at 45–46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5649–50. 
 12. See THE GLOBAL COMPACT, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 10TH 
PRINCIPLE AGAINST CORRUPTION 11–12 (2004), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ 
docs/issues_doc/7.7/guid_a-corr_081204.pdf; see, e.g., Doris Meissner, Immigration Reform and 
Policy in the Current Politically Polarized Climate, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 309, 314 
(2007). 
 13. CLARENCE C. WALTON, CORPORATE ENCOUNTERS: ETHICS, LAW AND THE BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT 188 (1992). 
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Although successful businesses establish and maintain a competitive 
advantage over other businesses, the former should not establish and 
maintain their advantage over the latter by illegally using and 
exploiting undocumented labor.14 While pre-IRCA legislation and 
case law placed all employers on a level playing field, post-IRCA 
case law coupled with the lack of government oversight of employers 
has had the opposite effect. 
A.  The Immigration and Nationality Act:  
A Level Playing Field 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),15 was not 
directly concerned with the employment of undocumented workers.16 
In fact, the employment of undocumented workers was not even 
illegal under INA.17 While employers could legally hire 
undocumented workers, these workers were nevertheless subject to 
deportation in the event they were caught working without the 
necessary labor certification.18 
 
 14. In addition to hindering development, corruption is “a costly business risk for 
companies. It can lead to environmental mismanagement, undermining of labour standards and 
restricts access to basic human rights.” THE GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 12, at 3. 
[Discrimination] leads to social tensions that are potentially disruptive [to the business 
environment] within the company and in society. A company that uses discriminatory 
practices in employment and occupation denies itself access to talents from a wider 
pool [of workers, and thus] skills and competencies. The hurt and resentment generated 
by discrimination will affect the performance of individuals and teams in the company. 
Discriminatory practices result in missed opportunities for development of skills and 
infrastructure to strengthen competitiveness in the national and global economy. 
Finally, discrimination can damage a company’s reputation, potentially affecting 
profits and stock value. 
THE GLOBAL COMPACT, THE LABOUR PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT: 
A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 33 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-multi/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_101246.pdf. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 
(2006)). 
 16. Richard E. Blum, Note, Labor Standards Enforcement and the Realities of Labor 
Migration: Protecting Undocumented Workers after Sure-Tan, IRCA, and Patel, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1342, 1359–60 (1988). 
 17. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 (1984); Peter 
Brownell, The Declining Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Sept. 1, 
2005), http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=332 (“[T]he 1952 law 
against ‘harboring’ undocumented aliens contained the ‘Texas Proviso,’ which spelled out that 
employment was not considered ‘harboring’ and was therefore legal.”). 
 18. Blum, supra note 16, at 1359–60. The Secretary of Labor only granted labor certification 
when there were not enough willing and able workers to fill the position and when such 
employment would not “adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the 
United States similarly employed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(5)(A)(i)(II). 
  
1438 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1431 
Under INA, there was little chance that law-abiding employers 
were disadvantaged solely based on the immigration laws. Because 
employers could hire workers regardless of immigration status, the 
pool of potential employees was open to all employers. Moreover, all 
employers were required to observe other labor laws, such as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which mandates payment of minimum 
wages and overtime, regardless of their employees’ documentation 
statuses.19 In sum, the only risk an employer faced when hiring an 
undocumented worker was that its employee could be deported from 
the country at any time if caught without the required labor 
certification.20 
B.  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board:  
A Chink in the Armor 
In passing INA, Congress was also concerned about the 
“treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.”21 Until the Supreme 
Court decided Sure-Tan, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board,22 
undocumented employees were entitled to the full protection of the 
country’s labor laws.23 This meant that all employers faced the same 
labor-law liabilities whether or not they chose to hire undocumented 
workers. 
In Sure-Tan, called “the most important development in pre-
IRCA case law,”24 a group of employees participated in a union 
organizing campaign.25 Most of the employees were undocumented 
workers.26 After they certified their union, their employer became 
upset and wrote a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service27 (INS) asking it to verify the workers’ immigration 
 
 19. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 702–03 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 20. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(2) (outlining several classes of deportable aliens, many of which 
encompass those who are ineligible for employment). 
 21. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359 (1976)). 
 22. 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 23. Blum, supra note 16, at 1343. 
 24. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented Workers, 58 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1361, 1368 (2009). 
 25. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 886. 
 26.  Id. 
 27. Originally, the INS was in charge of employer oversight. Kelsey E. Papst, Comment, 
Protecting the Voiceless: Ensuring ICE’s Compliance with Standards That Protect Immigration 
Detainees, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 261, 269 (2009). However, on March 1, 2003, Immigration 
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statuses.28 When INS officials visited the workplace, they discovered 
five undocumented employees.29 The workers later acknowledged 
their illegal presence in the country and opted for voluntary departure 
as a substitute for deportation.30 The National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), the agency responsible for enforcing the NLRA,31 charged 
the employer with violating the NLRA by requesting the INS to 
investigate the employees for engaging in union organization 
activities.32 
The Court held that the undocumented workers were properly 
considered “employees” under the NLRA and were thus entitled to 
its protections.33 However, even though the employees were entitled 
to those protections, the employees could only win reinstatement—a 
remedy under the NLRA—if they legally reentered the United States, 
and they could only collect back pay if they were deemed “available” 
for work.34 Because the employees were “not lawfully entitled to be 
present and employed in the United States,” they were deemed 
“unavailable” for work, tolling the accrual of back pay.35 
C.  IRCA and Subsequent Case Law:  
Opening the Door for Unscrupulous Employers 
In 1986, Congress passed IRCA as an INA amendment.36 By 
enacting IRCA—which included a provision making it illegal for 
employers to hire undocumented workers—Congress sought to 
control illegal immigration.37 Congress concluded that jobs were the 
magnet pulling undocumented workers into the country and decided 
that penalizing employers would deter the hiring of undocumented 
 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—which is part of the Department of Homeland Security—took 
over employer oversight. Id. 
 28. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Our History, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-
history (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 32. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 887–88. 
 33. Id. at 892. 
 34. Id. at 902–03, 888–89. 
 35. Id. at 903. 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5757. 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649. 
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workers and, as a result, curb illegal immigration.38 IRCA focuses on 
employer enforcement and employer sanctions. Subsequent court 
decisions interpreting the law, however, broadened IRCA’s impact 
on employment matters. 
1.  IRCA’s Effect on Employers 
With regard to employers, IRCA caused two major shifts in 
immigration law. First, IRCA shifted the responsibility and the 
power of enforcement to employers.39 Second, IRCA imposed 
sanctions on employers who knowingly hire, or continue to employ, 
undocumented workers.40 Prior to implementing employer sanctions, 
Congress created the Select Commission to conduct various studies 
evaluating then-existing laws and procedures regarding 
undocumented workers.41 Based on the Select Commission’s 
recommendations,42 Congress decided that employer sanctions were 
the “most humane, credible and effective way to respond to the 
large-scale influx” of undocumented workers.43 
 
 38. Id. at 46; see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1324–25 (6th ed. 2008) (“The reasoning behind employer 
sanctions is straightforward: (1) the imposition of penalties on employers of undocumented aliens 
will deter the hiring of such aliens; and (2) because securing employment is the primary reason 
for illegal entry and residence, this will reduce incentives for illegal entry.”). 
 39. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006). The idea of employer enforcement was not original to 
IRCA. For a more in-depth discussion regarding the origins of employer enforcement and 
employer sanctions see Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized 
Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 195–200 (2007). 
 40. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a). IRCA contains, however, a “small employer exemption from 
sanctions,” which states that the employers that employ three or fewer employees are exempted 
from employer sanctions and IRCA’s recordkeeping requirements. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, 
at 214–15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5751. 
 41. Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee 
Policy: A Critique, TEX. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1982, at 11. “The Select Commission held public 
hearings around the country, commissioned numerous papers from social scientists, historians, 
and other scholars, reviewed mountains of data, and after extensive study issued its final report 
(complete with seven volumes of appendices) in 1981.” Wishnie, supra note 39, at 200. 
 42. THE SELECT COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, THE FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 
WITH SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMMISSIONERS 301–30 (1981), available at http:// 
www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED211612. 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. 
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a.  Employer enforcement 
Under IRCA, employers act as screeners in the immigration 
process.44 Employers must verify all applicants’ documents before 
hiring them.45 Congress created the I-9 form to aid employers in this 
endeavor; employers are required to complete this form within three 
business days after the employment began.46 The I-9 form requires 
employers to examine applicants’ documents to establish not only 
identity but also employment authorization.47 Applicants may submit 
certain combinations of twenty-six different documents to establish 
employment eligibility.48 While employers must complete and retain 
I-9 forms to prove compliance in the case of ICE inspection,49 
employers need not photocopy the documents establishing 
employment eligibility.50 Employers must keep completed I-9 forms 
for three years after the date of hire or for one year after the date of 
termination, whichever is longer.51 
Employers must sign I-9 forms, under penalty of perjury, 
attesting that the documents “appear to be genuine and to relate to 
the employee . . . and that to the best of [the employer’s] knowledge 
the employee is authorized to work in the United States.”52 
Employers who comply in good faith with the I-9 form requirements 
 
 44. Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 
1112 (2009) (“[IRCA] imposed screening responsibilities on employers, requiring them to verify 
the immigration status of their workers and to keep records on whom they hired.”). 
 45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). For I-9 form purposes, “employer” means “all employers 
including those recruiters and referrers for a fee who are agricultural associations, agricultural 
employers, or farm labor contractors.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., OMB NO. 1615-0047, FORM I-9, EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 
VERIFICATION 1 (2009). 
 46. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 45, at 1. 
 47. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 198 (3d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3370 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2010) (No. 10-772). 
 48. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 45, at 5. “Employers cannot specify 
which document(s) listed on the last page of Form I-9 employees present to establish identity and 
employment authorization.” Id. at 1. 
 49. See id. at 2 (providing that I-9 forms “will be kept by the employer and made available 
for inspections by authorized officials of the Department of Homeland Security, Department of 
Labor, and Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices”). 
 50. Id. at 1 (“Employers may, but are not required to, photocopy the document(s) presented. 
If photocopies are made, they must be made for all new hires.”). 
 51. Id. at 2. 
 52. Id. at 4. 
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establish an affirmative defense that they did not knowingly employ 
an undocumented worker.53 
If an applicant does not present the required documentation, the 
employer cannot hire the worker.54 Similarly, if an employer 
discovers that it unknowingly hired an undocumented worker, or if 
the worker becomes unauthorized while employed, the employer is 
required to terminate the worker on discovery of the worker’s 
undocumented status.55 The I-9 form document-verification process 
only applies to employees and not to independent contractors.56 
b.  Employer sanctions 
Congress believed that employer sanctions had the potential to 
“close the back door”57 on future illegal immigration and called 
employer sanctions the “keystone” of IRCA.58 As a means of 
securing employer compliance, employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers or who accept documents that do not 
“reasonably appear” to be genuine are subject to civil and potentially 
criminal penalties.59 Currently, employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers are subject to civil fines between $375 and 
$3,200 for each undocumented worker for the first offense, between 
$3,200 and $6,500 for the second offense, and between $4,300 and 
$16,000 for the third and subsequent offenses.60 An employer who 
engages in a “pattern or practice” of violations is subject to 
maximum criminal penalties of $3,000 for each undocumented 
 
 53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2006). 
 54. Id. § 1324a(a)(1). 
 55. Hoffman v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(a)(2)). 
 56. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(f) (2006) (“The term employee means an individual who provides 
services or labor for an employer for wages or other remuneration but does not mean independent 
contractors . . . .”). 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. 
 58. BETSY COOPER & KEVIN O’NEIL, MIGRATION POLICY INST., LESSONS FROM THE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986, at 2 (2005), available at 
www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05.pdf; see also Michael Fix, Employer 
Sanctions: An Unfinished Agenda, in THE PAPER CURTAIN: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS’ 
IMPLEMENTATION, IMPACT, AND REFORM 1, 2 (Michael Fix ed., 1991) (“Sanctions, however, 
were thought to be the cornerstone of the law.”). 
 59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)–(b); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 62, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5661. 
 60. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(1)(ii)(A)–(C). Employers are also ordered to cease and desist from 
such behavior in addition to receiving civil fines. Id. § 274a.10(b)(1)(i). 
  
Summer 2011] FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE 1443 
worker and imprisonment of up to six months.61 Employers can also 
receive fines for paperwork violations, which occur when the 
employer does not complete or maintain I-9 forms.62 These fines 
range from $110 to $1,100 per violation and do not increase with 
subsequent violations.63 
Because Congress sought to balance controlling unauthorized 
immigration with discouraging discrimination against persons 
thought to be undocumented, civil penalties under IRCA are 
modest.64 To deter discrimination, Congress created substantial anti-
discrimination provisions in IRCA.65 Congress also created a Special 
Counsel in the Justice Department to handle IRCA discrimination 
charges.66 Under IRCA, an employer, therefore, may be liable for 
both knowingly hiring undocumented workers and for refusing to 
hire workers based on the mistaken perception that they are 
undocumented. 
2.  Post-IRCA Case Law 
With the passage of IRCA, the scope of the Court’s holding in 
Sure-Tan was unclear. While Sure-Tan showed that all “employees” 
were not to be treated equally under the NLRA,67 it was unclear 
whether the Court’s holding extended to undocumented workers 
continuously residing in the United States.68 While subsequent 
decisions could have decided that granting labor-law protections to 
undocumented workers encourages illegal immigration, courts have 
generally refused to interpret Sure-Tan’s holding so broadly. 
 
 61. Id. § 274a.10(a). 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5). 
 63. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2). 
In determining the amount of the penalty, consideration shall be given to: (i) [t]he size 
of the business of the employer being charged; (ii) [t]he good faith of the employer; 
(iii) [t]he seriousness of the violation; (iv) [w]hether or not the individual was an 
unauthorized alien; and (v) [t]he history of previous violations of the employer. 
Id. 
 64. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (providing that civil penalties may range from $250 to 
$10,000 depending on the circumstances); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49, reprinted 
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5653 (acknowledging “the widespread fear that sanctions could 
result in employment discrimination against Hispanics and other minority groups”). 
 65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (detailing what type of conduct qualifies as unfair and prohibited 
immigration-related employment practices). 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5653. 
 67. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 904–06 (1984). 
 68. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 24, at 1368–69. 
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In Patel v. Quality Inn South,69 the plaintiff, an undocumented 
worker, claimed that his employer violated FLSA’s wage and 
overtime provisions.70 Congress enacted FLSA in 1938 to “eliminate 
substandard working conditions.”71 FLSA entitles employees to 
minimum wage and overtime pay—one and one half times their 
regular hourly rate—in the event that they work more than forty 
hours in a week.72 Any employer who violates FLSA is liable for 
unpaid wages, an equal amount of liquidated damages, and 
attorney’s fees.73 The employer in Patel argued that as a result of 
IRCA, undocumented workers were no longer protected by FLSA 
and, even if they were, Sure-Tan precluded them from recovering 
damages.74 Using a rationale similar to the rationale in Sure-Tan, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that undocumented workers were 
“employees” under FLSA and were therefore entitled to the 
protections of FLSA.75 Regarding damages, the court distinguished 
Patel from Sure-Tan by stating that, in this case, the plaintiff sought 
damages for work that he had already performed, whereas the 
plaintiff in Sure-Tan sought back pay for work not yet performed.76 
The court reasoned that it did not make sense to consider the 
undocumented worker “‘unavailable’ for work during a period of 
time when he was actually working.”77 Therefore, the plaintiff could 
collect damages under FLSA.78 In sum, the court held that 
undocumented workers—regardless of their immigration statuses—
are entitled to all remedies under FLSA.79 
Following Patel, most courts held that undocumented workers 
were entitled to employment-law and labor-law protections, 
 
 69. 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 70. Id. at 701; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1982) (codifying the FLSA). 
 71. Patel, 846 F.2d at 702. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 
 74. Patel, 846 F.2d at 703. 
 75. See id. at 702–03 (“Congress enacted both the FLSA and the NLRA as part of the social 
legislation of the 1930’s . . . . More importantly the two acts similarly define the term ‘employee,’ 
and courts frequently look to the decisions under the NLRA when defining the FLSA’s 
coverage.”). Id. at 703. 
 76. Id. at 705. 
 77. Id. at 705–06. 
 78. Id. at 706. 
 79. Id. 
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excluding reinstatement, with regard to work that they had 
performed.80 The exclusion of reinstatement created a potential 
incentive for unscrupulous employers to take advantage of 
undocumented workers. The Supreme Court provided further 
incentive for the exploitation of undocumented labor by 
extinguishing employers’ monetary liability for wrongful termination 
of undocumented workers in violation of the NLRA in Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board.81 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (“Hoffman”) terminated Jose 
Castro (“Castro”), one of its employees, for participating in a union-
organizing campaign.82 By terminating Castro, Hoffman directly 
violated the NLRA.83 As part of the initial remedy that it awarded to 
Castro, the trial court ordered Hoffman to provide him back pay.84 
Later, during a compliance hearing, Castro admitted that he had 
never been authorized to work in the United States and that he 
tendered fraudulent documents to gain employment from Hoffman.85 
The Court declared that where a remedy “trenches upon a federal 
statute or policy . . . the . . . remedy may be required to yield.”86 
Awarding Castro back pay pursuant to the NLRA would contradict 
IRCA, the Court reasoned, thereby trenching upon a federal statute, 
because Castro could only claim the award by illegally remaining in 
the United States.87 The Court further postulated that requiring such 
an award would only encourage undocumented immigrants to 
illegally remain in the country.88 In short, the Court held that under 
the NLRA, employers are not liable for back pay to undocumented 
workers whom they wrongfully terminate.89 
 
 80. Wishnie, supra note 39, at 211. 
 81. 535 U.S. 137 (2002); see also Wishnie, supra note 39, at 212 (discussing how the 
Hoffman decision drastically changed the legal landscape that existed at the time). 
 82. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. 
 83. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting “discrimination in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization”). 
 84. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140–41. 
 85. Id. at 141. 
 86. Id. at 147. 
 87. See id. at 148–49 (discussing how it would undermine IRCA to award back pay to 
Castro since “it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United 
States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies”). 
 88. See id. at 150. 
 89. Id. at 151. 
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While many worried that Hoffman would be extended to exclude 
awards of back pay under other labor laws,90 subsequent 
administrative statements91 and cases92 have generally limited the 
holding in Hoffman. In Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,93 for 
example, the plaintiffs sought relief under FLSA claiming that Wal-
Mart failed to pay them minimum wage or overtime.94 Wal-Mart 
argued that the plaintiffs were seeking back pay, a remedy 
unavailable to them under Hoffman.95 Using reasoning similar to that 
in Patel, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
pointed out that the plaintiffs sought relief for work that they had 
already performed, unlike the plaintiff in Hoffman, who was seeking 
back pay for work he would have, but had not, performed.96 In sum, 
post-IRCA case law has extinguished undocumented workers’ 
remedies under the NLRA. While courts have generally refused to 
extend the Supreme Court’s holding in Hoffman to directly limit 
other labor laws, Hoffman has indirectly diluted undocumented 
workers’ labor protections beyond those provided by the NLRA.97 
D.  IRCA Enforcement (or Lack Thereof) 
Congress’s original focus in IRCA was on employer 
compliance.98 Congress believed that if it were to penalize employers 
 
 90. Richard A. Johnson, Note, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an Updated 
Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the United States, 21 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 260 (2007). 
 91. See Fact Sheet #48: Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of 
Hoffman Plastics Decision on Laws Enforced by the Wage and Hour Division, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR (revised July 2008), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs48.htm (explaining 
that the Department of Labor will continue to enforce FLSA regardless of whether the employee 
is undocumented). 
 92. See, e.g., Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
notwithstanding Hoffman, immigration status is not relevant in determining whether an employer 
engaged in national-origin discrimination under Title VII); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. 
Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (explaining that although Hoffman requires plaintiff’s claim 
of back pay to be dismissed in a Title VII action, Hoffman does not exclude the availability of 
other remedies under Title VII); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061–62 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(holding that in a FLSA action, Hoffman only precludes the specific remedy of back pay).  
 93. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 94. Id. at 301. 
 95. Id. at 321. 
 96. Id. at 322. 
 97. See infra Part III. 
 98. See Lee, supra note 44, at 1126 (noting that the design and history of IRCA “suggests 
that Congress intended to deter unauthorized immigration by targeting employers”). 
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for knowingly hiring undocumented workers, employers would 
refrain from hiring them.99 It follows that if employers were not 
hiring undocumented workers, those workers would have no reason 
to come to the country.100 In the initial years after IRCA passed, the 
General Accounting Office101 determined that the INS was 
“satisfactorily” implementing employer sanctions.102 Until recently, 
raids were ICE’s most commonly used enforcement tool.103 However, 
since then ICE has now turned its focus to employer audits.104 
1.  Raids as an Enforcement Tool 
Predominantly used during President George W. Bush’s 
administration, high-profile raids on big businesses were ICE’s main 
enforcement strategy for some time.105 ICE considered raids to be an 
efficient means of enforcement because agents could detain hundreds 
of undocumented workers during one raid, reducing costly and time-
consuming investigations.106 Because the media documented these 
high-profile raids well, ICE believed the raids would deter both 
employers and employees from violating IRCA.107 Some raids were 
very extensive. For example, while ICE made 3,677 arrests in 2006, 
more than one-third of those arrests came from one raid, “Operation 
Wagon Train,” a raid against meatpacking facilities that Swift & 
Company owned.108 
 
 99. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 38, at 1324–25. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Since 2004, the General Accounting Office has been known as the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO). David M. Walker, GAO Answers the Question: What’s in a Name, 
ROLL CALL (July 19, 2004), http://www.rollcall.com/issues/50_8/-6262-1.html. The GAO’s work 
involves “program evaluations, policy analyses, and legal opinions and decisions on a broad 
range of government programs and activities both at home and abroad.” Id. 
 102. Brownell, supra note 17. 
 103. See Miriam Jordan, ‘Silent Raids’ Squeeze Illegal Workers, WALL ST. J, Mar. 29, 2011, 
at A6. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Benjamin Crouse, Comment, Worksite Raids and Immigration Norms: A “Sticky” 
Problem, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 591, 598 (2009). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. ALEINKOFF ET AL., supra note 38, at 1324. Other high-profile raids include a 2008 raid 
on an Agriprocessors plant located in Postville, Iowa. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Raid Jars a 
Small Town, WASH. POST, May 18, 2008, at A1. During the raid 389 undocumented workers 
were detained. Id. At the time, it was the Bush administration’s largest raid at a single site. Id. 
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2.  Employer Audits 
Although enforcement was up between 2006 and 2008 as 
compared to previous years, that was a result of workplace raids that 
were focused on arresting undocumented employees.109 Since then 
arrests have been down due to the Obama administration’s focus on 
employer audits.110 While the Obama administration has stated that 
on-site arrests of undocumented workers will still continue, it will 
focus enforcement efforts on employer compliance.111 ICE is 
focusing on employer compliance by its use of, among other things, 
employer audits.112 
Employer audits consist of ICE auditing employers’ I-9 forms to 
ensure compliance.113 An audit starts when ICE sends an employer a 
Notice of Inspection, which requests that the employer supply ICE 
with certain documentation, including I-9 forms.114 ICE usually 
allows the employer three days to present the documents, unless the 
investigation is part of a criminal investigation, in which case ICE 
 
 109. See Fact Sheet: Worksite Enforcement, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/worksite.htm [hereinafter U.S. 
Immigration Fact Sheet] (displaying graph of arrests between 2002 and 2008). In 2005, arrests 
totaled 176 criminal arrests, 1,116 administrative arrests; in 2006, arrests totaled 716 criminal 
arrests, 3,667 administrative arrests; in 2007, arrests totaled 863 criminal arrests, 4,077 
administrative arrests; and in 2008, arrests totaled 1,103 criminal arrests, 5,184 administrative 
arrests. Id. 
 110. See Penny Starr, ICE Official: Work-Site Arrests of Illegal Aliens ‘Down From Previous 
Years,’ CNSNEWS.COM (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/60925 (discussing how 
under the Obama administration, there have been very few ICE operations that have led to the 
arrests of undocumented workers due to the administration’s move away from work-site raids); 
see also U.S. Immigration Fact Sheet, supra note 109 (“ICE will focus its resources in the 
worksite enforcement program on the criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly hire 
illegal workers in order to target the root cause of illegal immigration.”). 
 111. Starr, supra note 110. 
 112. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 
2008 16 (2008), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/annual-report/ 
2008annual-report.pdf (explaining that during 2008 ICE started implementing “debarment” 
proceedings against employers who either knowingly hired or continued to employ an alien who 
became unauthorized). Debarment prohibits companies from receiving or competing for federal 
contracts. Id. During fiscal year 2008, “ICE launched debarment proceedings against seven 
companies.” Id. 
 113. See Miriam Jordan, Chipotle Workers Draw Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2011, at B1 
(discussing how Minnesota Chipotle restaurants dismissed hundreds of employees after the 
company received notices of “suspect documents” from ICE). 
 114. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET: FORM I-9 INSPECTION 
OVERVIEW 1 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/ 
pdf/i9-inspection.pdf (explaining that ICE can also compel the production of “supporting 
documentation, which may include a copy of the payroll, list of current employees, Articles of 
Incorporation, and business licenses”). 
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can demand the documents immediately.115 If ICE finds any 
procedural violations, the employer has ten business days to make 
corrections.116 If the employer does not correct the problems, it may 
receive a fine.117 However, if ICE can determine that the employer 
knowingly hired or continued to employ undocumented workers, the 
employer “will be required to cease the unlawful activity, may be 
fined, and in certain situations may be prosecuted criminally.”118 
When determining the amount of the penalty, ICE will consider five 
factors: (1) the size of the business, (2) whether there was a good-
faith effort to comply, (3) the seriousness of the violation, (4) 
whether the violation involved undocumented workers, and (5) the 
history of previous violations.119 Employer audits are becoming more 
frequent: during the 2010 fiscal year ICE conducted 2,740 employer 
audits, nearly twice as many as it conducted in 2009.120 
III.  IRCA’S DILUTING EFFECT ON LABOR LAWS:  
AN INVITATION FOR UNSCRUPULOUS  
EMPLOYERS TO EXPLOIT UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
Employers are exposed to great liability in the course of their 
businesses. Admittedly, many liabilities are the same for all 
employers regardless of whether they choose to hire undocumented 
workers.121 Notwithstanding those similarities, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Hoffman—that employers’ liability under the NLRA 
depends on whether the employee is undocumented—counteracts 
IRCA by creating an incentive for unscrupulous employers to seek 
out and hire undocumented workers because the employers are 
exposed to less liability by doing so.122 Hoffman, in an attempt to 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Jordan, supra note 113, at B1. 
 121. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, all employers are prohibited from harassing 
employees based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2006). 
In Patel, the Eleventh Circuit held that employers are liable to “employees,” which includes 
undocumented workers, under FLSA to pay them minimum wage and overtime pay if the 
employee works more than forty hours a week. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 702 (11th 
Cir. 1988). 
 122. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 151 
(2002). 
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punish undocumented workers, gives employers who knowingly hire 
such workers a competitive advantage over law-abiding employers 
by immunizing the unscrupulous employers from liability for back 
pay under the NLRA, in addition to indirectly weakening the effect 
of other labor laws. By creating this incentive for unscrupulous 
employers, IRCA and Hoffman exacerbate rather than deter illegal 
migration. 
The court in Patel stated that “[i]f the FLSA did not cover 
undocumented [workers], employers would have an incentive to hire 
them.”123 FLSA counteracted this would-be incentive by prohibiting 
unscrupulous employers from paying employees less than minimum 
wage.124 In Hoffman, however, the Court did not apply this same 
reasoning to employers’ violations of undocumented workers’ rights 
under the NLRA. 
A.  Hoffman Incentivizes Unscrupulous Employers  
to Violate the NLRA, IRCA, and Other Labor Laws 
Employers who violate the NLRA are subject to “an order 
requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor 
practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement 
of employees with or without back pay.”125 Hoffman’s holding that 
employers of undocumented workers are not liable for back pay 
under the NLRA has a sizable effect on employers’ overall 
liability.126 
Assume that both Employer A’s and Employer B’s employees 
want to unionize. Employer A—the law-abiding employer—will 
accept its employees’ unionization efforts. Employer B—the 
unscrupulous employer—will terminate any employee involved in 
unionization efforts. Because Employer B hired undocumented 
workers, it will not be liable for back pay under the NLRA, 
according to Hoffman.127 Although Employer B will be required to 
“cease and desist its violations of the NLRA and . . . conspicuously 
post notices to employees setting forth their rights under the 
 
 123. Patel, 846 F.2d at 704. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2006). 
 126. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 151. 
 127. Id. at 151–52. 
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NLRA,”128 these obligations carry no monetary liability.129 In fact, 
these obligations have no deterrent effect whatsoever on Employer B 
because none of the rights that Employer B must conspicuously post 
apply to Employer B’s undocumented workers anyway. This is 
precisely what Justice Breyer meant in his dissent when he stated, 
“employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws . . . 
with impunity.”130 
Employer B, though, still faces potential sanctions for violating 
IRCA. But, if this is Employer B’s first IRCA violation, it will only 
face fines between $375 and $3,200 for each undocumented 
employee. In comparison, liability for back pay under the NLRA is 
much greater. Thus, by hiring undocumented workers, Employer B 
can substitute its negligible exposure to IRCA penalties for the more 
substantial liability that it would face under the NLRA for its anti-
union activities. 
The problem becomes even clearer when one considers that the 
same employers who violate labor laws such as FLSA and the NLRA 
rely heavily on undocumented workers. A 2008 study of low-wage 
workers concluded that employment-law and labor-law violations 
were “severe and widespread” among low-wage labor markets.131 
Employers in those low-wage industries were also very likely to hire 
undocumented workers. Of the workers interviewed for the low-
wage study, 70 percent were foreign-born, and more than 55 percent 
of those workers openly admitted that they were undocumented.132 
Wal-Mart (whose slogan until recently was “Always Low 
Prices”)133 is an example of an employer with a history of seeking out 
undocumented workers and committing severe labor-law violations 
to increase profits. An internal audit of Wal-Mart stores revealed that 
many stores regularly violated not only child-labor laws but also 
 
 128. Id. at 152. For an example of what a notice contains, see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 
Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 100, 101 (1992). 
 129. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 139. 
 130. Id. at 154 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 131. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS 
OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 2 (2009), available at http:// 
nelp.3cdn.net/1797b93dd1ccdf9e7d_sdm6bc50n.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 15. 
 133. Ylan Q. Mui & Michael S. Rosenwald, Wal-Mart’s New Tack: Show ‘Em the Payoff, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2007, at D1. 
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wage laws because employees worked through breaks without pay.134 
In addition to those labor-law violations, more than 250 
undocumented workers were detained by ICE after being caught 
during a night raid on sixty Wal-Mart stores in 2003.135 Although 
independent contractors employed the workers (eliminating Wal-
Mart’s obligation to verify employees’ work eligibility under IRCA), 
subsequent evidence showed that Wal-Mart executives and store 
managers acquiesced to IRCA violations.136 
Wal-Mart is also notoriously anti-union and goes to great pains 
to keep employees from unionizing.137 Wal-Mart has repeatedly 
violated the NLRA by interrogating workers, confiscating union 
literature, and firing union supporters.138 In addition, Wal-Mart uses 
video surveillance to monitor employees and regularly hires union 
busters.139 
While unscrupulous employers like Wal-Mart are exposed to 
potential liability for violating other labor laws, Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Hoffman addressed an anomaly that can occur as a result of 
the majority’s decision.140 Under IRCA, it is only unlawful for an 
employer to hire an undocumented worker knowing the worker is 
undocumented.141 Thus, the majority’s decision encourages 
employers to hire with a “wink and a nod” potentially undocumented 
workers because doing so will lower the costs of labor-law 
violations.142 For example, if Employer B claims it “unknowingly” 
hired undocumented workers, it would not only diminish its labor-
 
 134. Steven Greenhouse, In-House Audit Says Wal-Mart Violated Labor Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 13, 2004, at A16. 
 135. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Raids by U.S. Aimed at Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 24, 2003, at A1. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Karen Olsson, Up Against Wal-Mart, MOTHER JONES, Mar.–Apr. 2003, available at 
http://motherjones.com/politics/2003/03/against-wal-mart. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 155–56 
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 141. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 142. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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law liability but also evade IRCA liability because it does not meet 
the requisite standard.143 
Under IRCA, proving employer knowledge is very difficult.144 
This is true because employers have an affirmative defense if they 
comply with IRCA’s standards in “good faith.”145 Thus, unless an 
employer acknowledges acting in bad faith, ICE must prove 
employer knowledge with circumstantial evidence. But other labor 
laws do not require an employer to acknowledge bad faith. Under 
FLSA, employers are liable for the amount of the unpaid wages in 
addition to an equal amount of liquidated damages regardless of their 
intention to violate the law.146 Similarly, employer liability under the 
NLRA is triggered by an employer’s affirmative action to hinder 
unionization.147 
Taking all of this into consideration, in a best-case scenario for 
Employer B, it will not be subject to any monetary penalties under 
IRCA or the NLRA for wrongful termination of its undocumented 
workers. In a worst-case scenario, Employer B will be liable for 
between $375 and $3,200 for each undocumented employee under 
IRCA. 
In contrast, Employer A’s labor costs will significantly increase 
as a result of the employees’ unionization. Specifically, in the 
construction industry unionized workers earn up to 51.9 percent 
more base pay than nonunionized workers earn.148 Assuming that 
Employer A paid all ten of its employees federal minimum wage 
 
 143. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (“It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire . . . for 
employment in the United States an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 144. Susan Carroll, Few Firms Fined Over Hiring, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 1, 2010, at A1 
(explaining the difficulty in distinguishing between an employer that has been unintentionally 
duped into accepting fraudulent documents and an employer that is accepting them knowing that 
they are fraudulent). 
 145. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3). The same is true even if the employer committed procedural or 
technical errors in attempting to comply. Id. § 1324a(b)(6)(A). 
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006). However, only employers who willfully violate FLSA can be 
criminally punished. Id. § 216(a). 
 147. See id. § 158(a)(1)–(5) (defining employer actions that constitute unfair labor practices). 
 148. Union Member Summary, supra note 6, tbl.4. This result is not exclusive to the 
construction industry. In industries that heavily rely on migrant labor, unionized employees earn 
far more than nonunion employees. For example, unionized employees earn 43 percent more in 
the building, maintenance, and groundskeeping industry; 40 percent more in the transportation 
industry; 33 percent more in the production and manufacturing industry; and 17 percent more in 
the food preparation industry. Id. 
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before they unionized, which is unlikely, its labor costs for a forty-
hour workweek would increase from $2,900 to $4,612, a weekly 
increase of $1,712. This figure accounts for only base pay and does 
not include overtime pay or increased payroll tax liability. 
Now assume that Employer A, in a moment of frustration, 
terminated its employees. In addition to the NLRB requiring it to 
cease and desist and to post a notice to its employees, Employer A 
will now be required to pay its employees back pay and, in some 
cases, reinstate them.149 Assuming that the court orders back pay 
rather than reinstatement, Employer A will have to hire more 
employees. Thus, in addition to paying his new employees, 
Employer A will have to provide back pay to the workers it 
wrongfully terminated. Under the NLRA, back pay is calculated on a 
quarterly basis.150 Notwithstanding the current economic state of the 
construction industry, assume that the NLRB requires Employer A to 
reimburse back pay for just one quarter. This adds up to $37,671. 
Exploring the bottom-line results of this scenario, Employer A 
will either indefinitely have to pay at least $1,712 weekly in 
increased labor costs or $37,671 in NLRA penalties. In a worst-case 
scenario for Employer B, it will only have to pay IRCA fines 
between $375 and $3,200 for each employee. Even if ICE finds 
Employer B to have the requisite knowledge—which, as previously 
mentioned, is very difficult to prove—and Employer B receives the 
maximum penalty under IRCA for each employee, which is 
unlikely,151 its total liability would still be $5,671 less than Employer 
A’s liability would be under the NLRA. If ICE fines Employer B the 
minimum amount for each employee, Employer B’s liability would 
be $33,921 less than Employer A’s. Finally, if ICE does not fine 
 
 149. See, e.g., Elam v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 395 F.2d 611, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per 
curiam) (ordering employer to provide reinstatement and back pay to wrongfully terminated 
striking employees). 
 150. In re F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289, 293 (1950) (“Loss of pay shall be 
determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which [the employee] would normally have 
earned for each such quarter or portion thereof, her net earnings, if any, in other employment 
during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay 
liability for any other quarter.”). In addition, the National Labor Relations Board decided that 
back pay is subject to daily compounded interest. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 8 
(Oct. 22, 2010). 
 151. During an audit of an Illinois company, ICE discovered that nearly 80 percent of the 
company’s employees had questionable documents. Similarly, an audit of a Texas company 
revealed that more than half of the company’s 107 employees had suspicious paperwork. ICE did 
not fine either of these two companies. Carroll, supra note 144, at A1. 
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Employer B, it receives a complete windfall. Thus, no matter the 
outcome, Employer B is essentially rewarded for openly violating 
IRCA and the NLRA. Employer B is therefore incentivized to seek 
out and hire undocumented workers. 
In sum, no matter what Employer A decides to do—accept 
unionization or terminate its employees—it is placed at a competitive 
disadvantage as compared to Employer B. Moreover, Employer B 
can direct its savings to securing market share at Employer A’s 
further expense. 
B.  Hoffman Is a Direct Result of IRCA 
In essence, the Supreme Court in Hoffman faced a decision: 
whether to punish Jose Castro’s illegal tendering of fraudulent 
documents, which undermined IRCA’s verification system, or to 
punish Hoffman’s wrongful termination of Castro, which directly 
violated the NLRA.152 Ultimately the Court decided to punish 
Castro’s actions. The Court’s Hoffman decision was a direct result of 
IRCA. However, to link Hoffman to IRCA, it is helpful to explore 
the Court’s reasoning in Sure-Tan, which also involved the NLRA. 
As mentioned above, the Court in Sure-Tan declared that 
undocumented workers are “employees” under the NLRA.153 As 
such, undocumented workers are entitled to full NLRA protections.154 
In Sure-Tan, Justice O’Connor stated that there was no inherent 
conflict between INA and the NLRA because INA did not make it 
illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers or for 
unauthorized immigrants to gain employment after they entered the 
country illegally.155 However, in enacting INA, Congress was 
concerned with the illegal entry of unauthorized immigrants.156 By 
conditioning the plaintiff’s reinstatement offer on legal reentry and 
tolling the accrual of back pay during any time the plaintiff was not 
entitled to be present and employed in the United States, the Court 
took into account INA’s objective of deterring unauthorized 
 
 152. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 140–41, 
148 (2002) (describing both parties’ statutory violations). 
 153. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 892–93. 
 156. Id. at 903. 
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immigration and thereby avoided a potential conflict between INA 
and the NLRA.157 
In contrast, the Court in Hoffman held that awarding back pay to 
an undocumented worker inherently conflicted with IRCA.158 With 
IRCA’s passage, Congress made it illegal for employers to hire 
undocumented workers and for undocumented workers to accept 
employment in the United States.159 By providing fraudulent 
documents to Hoffman to gain employment, Castro engaged in 
criminal behavior that directly violated IRCA.160 
The Court in Hoffman sidestepped construing Sure-Tan, which 
has two potential interpretations. First, a plain-language 
interpretation of Sure-Tan dictates that employees who were never 
lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the United States are 
not entitled to back pay.161 Second, a contextual interpretation of 
Sure-Tan states that this limitation only applies to unauthorized 
immigrants who leave the country and cannot claim back pay 
without lawful reentry.162 
Factually, Sure-Tan and Hoffman were fairly similar. The 
deciding factor in Sure-Tan was that the undocumented employee 
returned to Mexico. Therefore, to avoid a conflict with INA, the back 
pay and reinstatement remedies had to be limited to require lawful 
reentry into the United States. After Sure-Tan it was unclear what 
would have happened if the plaintiff had stayed in the United States, 
which is precisely what Jose Castro did in Hoffman. The Court in 
Hoffman chose not to resolve the question regarding Sure-Tan’s 
interpretation and also refused to award Castro with back pay.163 
Why did the Hoffman Court leave open the issue of Sure-Tan’s 
interpretation?164 The reason is because the legal landscape 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 149 
(2002). 
 159. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006); Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148 (explaining that to gain 
employment, an undocumented worker must provide fraudulent documents, which undermines 
IRCA). 
 160. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 141, 143. The Court held that “awarding [back pay] to illegal 
aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA.” Id. at 149. 
 161. Id. at 146. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 151. 
 164. Id. at 147. 
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“significantly changed” when Congress passed IRCA.165 Unlike INA, 
IRCA made it illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers 
and for unauthorized immigrants to accept employment in the United 
States.166 In addition, IRCA implemented an employment verification 
system, which is “critical to the IRCA regime.”167 By tendering 
fraudulent documents, Castro “subvert[ed] the cornerstone of 
IRCA’s enforcement mechanism . . . .”168 The Court also stated that 
awarding back pay “would unduly trench upon explicit statutory 
prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in 
IRCA.”169 Therefore, the Hoffman Court could not have reached the 
same holding if Congress had not enacted IRCA. 
C.  IRCA’s Diluting Effect on  
Undocumented Workers’ Labor Rights 
While undocumented workers’ remedies under the NLRA are 
limited, protections under other labor laws, such as FLSA and Title 
VII, remain intact, at least in theory.170 Notwithstanding Hoffman, the 
U.S. Department of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, the agencies in charge of enforcing FLSA and Title 
VII, respectively, have stated that these labor laws apply to 
undocumented workers, regardless of their immigration statuses.171 
While equal labor-law protection is true in theory, it is not true in 
practice. As a result of IRCA, many undocumented workers are 
hesitant to assert their rights under FLSA or Title VII because they 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 147–48. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 148. 
 169. Id. at 151. 
 170. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that undocumented 
workers can recover under FLSA); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Switching Sys. Div. of 
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Plaintiff plainly is correct that 
Title VII’s protections extend to aliens who may be in this country either legally or illegally.”). 
 171. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 91 (“The Department’s Wage and Hour Division will 
continue to enforce the FLSA . . . without regard to whether an employee is documented or 
undocumented. Enforcement of these laws is distinguishable from ordering back pay under the 
NLRA.”); Rescission of Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented 
Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (June 27, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html (“The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hoffman in no way calls into question the settled principle that undocumented 
workers are covered by the federal employment discrimination statutes and that it is as illegal for 
employers to discriminate against them as it is to discriminate against individuals authorized to 
work.”). 
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fear employer retaliation, which often comes in threats of 
termination, or worse, deportation.172 By prohibiting employers from 
hiring undocumented workers, IRCA acts to prevent undocumented 
workers from asserting their labor rights.173 
With regard to FLSA enforcement, the Department of Labor 
entered into an agreement with the former INS to not report workers’ 
undocumented statuses that are discovered during investigations of 
employee-alleged violations.174 Thus, while in theory undocumented 
workers’ fears of deportation for reporting workplace violations are 
unfounded, they are nevertheless hesitant to report their employers’ 
violations. As evidenced by Hoffman, IRCA claims are prioritized 
over labor-law claims. This in turn chills undocumented workers 
from asserting their labor-law rights. 
In particular, workplace raids have caused undocumented 
workers to avoid claiming workplace violations. In many instances, 
ICE has worked with employers to arrest and deport undocumented 
workers.175 Thus, from an undocumented worker’s point of view, the 
government is more concerned that he or she is deported than treated 
fairly by his or her employer. The end result is that undocumented 
workers shy away from reporting labor-law violations. 
As previously mentioned, many employers that violate labor 
laws also hire undocumented workers. Thus, in practice, an 
unscrupulous employer’s purported compliance with IRCA places it 
in a position to gain knowledge of its worker’s immigration status 
and to use that status to exploit the employee. Because the employee 
is unlikely to assert his or her rights under the labor laws, the 
unscrupulous employer gains another advantage over the law-abiding 
 
 172. See Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII 
Context and Beyond, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 492 (2005) (“[U]ndocumented workers 
are reluctant to enforce their rights . . . given the risks not only of retaliatory discharge but also of 
retaliatory reporting to the Department of Homeland Security and concomitant criminal 
prosecution.”). 
 173. Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for 
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 264–65 
(2009). 
 174. Memorandum of Understanding: Between the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Department of Justice and the Employment Standards Administration Department of Labor, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIV. (Nov. 23, 1998), http://www.dol.gov/whd/whatsnew/ 
mou/nov98mou.htm. 
 175. Lee, supra note 44, at 1108. 
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employer in the form of lower wages through wage violations. In 
sum, IRCA acts to dilute undocumented workers’ labor-law rights 
while allowing unscrupulous employers to gain another advantage 
over law-abiding employers. 
D.  IRCA and Hoffman Actually  
Increase Unauthorized Immigration 
As described above, IRCA and Hoffman have diluted 
undocumented workers’ labor-law rights. Because employers are 
therefore exposed to little potential liability, IRCA and Hoffman have 
created an economic incentive for unscrupulous employers to hire 
undocumented workers. On passing IRCA, Congress concluded that 
undocumented workers primarily migrate to the United States for 
jobs.176 Therefore, by not decreasing the pull that jobs have on 
undocumented immigrants, IRCA and Hoffman in effect increase the 
population of undocumented immigrants.177 If, in practice, employers 
were liable under the NLRA and other labor laws regardless of an 
employee’s documented status, that would eliminate both the current 
competitive disadvantage for law-abiding employers and the reason 
for which undocumented immigrants come to the country, namely 
jobs. 
The court in Patel doubted that undocumented workers “come to 
this country to gain the protection of our labor laws.”178 However, 
even though granting labor-law protections does not increase the 
unauthorized immigrant population, Justice Breyer dissented in 
Hoffman because denying a back pay remedy could increase the 
strength of the “magnetic force” that draws undocumented 
immigrants into the country.179 Justice Breyer reasoned that by not 
levying a monetary penalty against an unscrupulous employer, the 
Hoffman court decreased the cost of the violation and thereby 
increased the employer’s desire to hire undocumented workers.180 
 
 176. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46, 53 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 
5649–50. 
 177. See Kim, supra note 173, at 264–65. 
 178. Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 179. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137, 155–56 
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 155–56. 
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This effect becomes evident when examining the 
undocumented-immigrant population. When IRCA passed, the 
United States had an estimated population of 3.2 million 
undocumented immigrants.181 The number of undocumented 
immigrants initially dropped after IRCA passed, but that has been 
primarily attributed to the fact that Congress granted permanent 
residency status to 2.7 million undocumented immigrants under 
IRCA’s amnesty provision.182 During the first decade after IRCA 
passed, the unauthorized-immigrant population increased at an 
average rate of 500,000 people annually.183 During the 2000s, the 
average rate increased to between 700,000 and 800,000 people 
annually.184 As of March 2010, the number of undocumented 
immigrants in the United States was 11.2 million, down from a high 
of 12 million in 2007.185 Thus, by failing to discourage employers 
from hiring undocumented workers, ICRA increases unauthorized 
immigration. 
In contrast, if Congress were to repeal IRCA and ensure that—in 
practice—undocumented workers enjoy the same protections that 
documented workers enjoy under the NLRA, the incentive to hire 
undocumented workers would decrease. To be sure, employers that 
rely on immigrant labor have a very real desire to stop their 
employees from unionizing. Immigrants are becoming increasingly 
more active in unions.186 Specifically, Latino workers are the fastest-
growing union contingency, representing 12.2 percent of union 
members, up from 5.8 percent in 1983.187 Thus, if employers could 
 
 181. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS RESIDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: ESTIMATES SINCE 1986, at 2–3 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
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 182. Wishnie, supra note 39, at 205–06; see also COOPER & O’NEIL, supra note 58, at 3 
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 183. WASEM, supra note 181, at 4. 
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 185. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED 
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 187. See id. (comparing the growth of Latino union workers to the growth of Asian Pacific 
American and African-American union workers). 
  
Summer 2011] FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE 1461 
not prevent undocumented workers from joining unions, the 
employers would have less incentive to hire those workers. The net 
effect would be a decrease in the magnetic pull that jobs have on 
undocumented workers, which would, in all likelihood, reduce 
unauthorized immigration. 
The same would also be true in the context of FLSA. There is no 
doubt that unscrupulous employers seek out undocumented workers 
in part to be able to pay depressed wages. If Congress were to repeal 
IRCA and assure equal rights to undocumented workers under 
FLSA—in practice and not just in theory—then unscrupulous 
employers would have no reason to hire them. The effect would 
again be a decrease in unauthorized migration. 
IV.  UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF IRCA FAILS  
TO DISCOURAGE UNSCRUPULOUS EMPLOYERS  
FROM HIRING UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS  
Under IRCA, all employers are subject to the same 
administrative requirements.188 While employers originally opposed 
such requirements, they now generally agree that the requirements 
are less burdensome than they anticipated.189 As explained above, all 
employers must use I-9 forms to verify employees’ employment 
eligibility.190 Also, all employers must accept a document if it 
“reasonably appears on its face to be genuine.”191 
As dictated by IRCA, the government oversees employers and 
ensures that they comply with IRCA’s requirements.192 Congress 
believed that because “[t]he penalties are uniformly applied to all 
employers,”193 employer enforcement would not create an inherent 
disadvantage for any employer.194 While the initial goal was uniform 
 
 188. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 45, at 1 (“[T]he term ‘employer’ means 
all employers including those recruiters and referrers for a fee who are agricultural associations, 
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 189. Wishnie, supra note 39, at 208. 
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enforcement,195 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) later 
concluded that both INS and ICE made the worksite-enforcement 
program a relatively low priority.196 While all employers are subject 
to the same substantive requirements, ICE’s historical under-
enforcement of IRCA emboldens unscrupulous employers to exploit 
undocumented workers because there is little risk that ICE will fine 
employers that violate IRCA. 
A.  Creation of Competitive Disadvantage  
for Law-Abiding Employers 
ICE admits that law-abiding employers are placed at an unfair 
disadvantage because unscrupulous employers pay undocumented 
workers low wages.197 This unfair-competition effect was foreseeable 
and evident even in the early years after Congress passed IRCA.198 
Nevertheless, Congress has failed to properly remedy this issue, and, 
as a result, unscrupulous employers continue to exploit 
undocumented workers to lower labor costs and realize higher 
profits. 
Undocumented immigrants who come to the country are 
disproportionately likely to be less educated than other groups are, 
which is one reason why undocumented immigrants are more likely 
to hold low-skilled, labor-intensive jobs rather than white-collar 
jobs.199 While the undocumented-immigrant population represents 
5.4 percent of the total workforce, undocumented workers are 
overrepresented in several labor-intensive occupations.200 For 
example, undocumented workers make up 25 percent of all farm 
 
 195. See id. (stating that the penalties will be applied uniformly to all employers who hire, 
recruit, or refer undocumented aliens). 
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workers; 19 percent of building, groundskeeping, and maintenance 
workers; 17 percent of construction workers; 12 percent of food 
preparation and serving workers; 10 percent of production workers; 
and 7 percent of transportation and material moving workers.201 
It is not surprising, then, that in these labor-intensive industries 
labor typically accounts for the largest portion of employers’ 
expenses.202 For example, in the food industry, labor accounts for 
roughly 38.5 percent of an employer’s expenses.203 Moreover, the 
profit margins in these low-skilled industries are typically smaller 
than the profit margins in other industries.204 For example, the 
average profit margin in heavy construction is 3.3 percent, while it is 
7.5 percent in restaurants.205 On the other hand, the average profit 
margin in high-skilled industries can be much higher; for example, it 
is 22.7 percent in the software industry and 16.5 percent in the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.206 Because of typically lower 
profit margins, low-skilled industries are more sensitive to 
fluctuations in labor costs, which gives unscrupulous employers an 
incentive to cut corners and violate the law. Because of this “race to 
the bottom,”207 unscrupulous employers have an incentive to either 
directly exploit undocumented workers by violating wage regulations 
or indirectly exploit undocumented workers through independent 
contractors. 
1.  Wage Violations 
Many undocumented workers come to this country seeking a 
better life for their families through higher-paying jobs.208 Because 
jobs in their home countries usually pay much less than jobs in the 
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United States pay, immigrants will take less pay than is legally 
required because such pay is much more than they would make in 
their home countries.209 Most commonly, unscrupulous employers 
exploit undocumented workers by paying less than the legally 
required minimum wage and violating overtime-pay requirements.210 
By reducing what could constitute their single largest expense, 
unscrupulous employers not only increase their profits but also 
remain competitive in the marketplace. 
In a study of low-wage employees, female, foreign-born 
undocumented workers were almost three times as likely to be the 
victims of minimum-wage violations as compared to women born in 
the United States.211 Nearly half of these unauthorized female 
workers suffered minimum-wage violations just one week before the 
study.212 Similarly, foreign-born unauthorized men were nearly twice 
as likely to suffer minimum-wage violations as compared to men 
born in the United States.213 Moreover, the amount by which 
employers underpaid these workers significant. Sixty percent of the 
workers in the study were underpaid by more than one dollar an 
hour.214 Violation rates also varied with race and ethnicity.215 Nearly 
one-third of Latino workers experienced minimum wage violations, 
compared to only 8 percent of white workers.216 
FLSA mandates overtime pay, which requires employers to pay 
employees “time and a half,” or one-and-one-half times the regular 
hourly rate for each hour that the employees work over forty hours 
each week.217 Also, some states require daily overtime pay when 
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employees work more than a specified number of hours each day.218 
In the same study of low-wage workers, nearly 85 percent of 
undocumented workers reported at least one overtime violation.219 
This study supports the proposition that unscrupulous employers 
seek out undocumented workers in order to depress the employees’ 
wages and to remain immune from monetary sanctions. 
Assume that Employer B pays one of its employees $6.25 an 
hour, just $1.00 less an hour than the federal minimum wage.220 Also 
assume that Employer B requires the employee to work fifty hours a 
week and does not pay the employee FLSA-mandated overtime.221 At 
this rate, Employer B saves just over $71 a week. As previously 
mentioned, the civil fine for first-time violators of IRCA is between 
$375 and $3,200 for each undocumented worker. Therefore, 
Employer B has to keep the employee for just over five weeks to 
realize the savings if it is fined $375, and just over 10 months if it is 
fined $3,200. Keep in mind that this example does not take into 
account additional savings that Employer B would realize if it were 
to pay the employee in cash, thereby avoiding FICA taxes.222 
2.  IRCA Incentivizes Unscrupulous Employers  
Not to Investigate Whether an Independent  
Contractor Hires Undocumented Workers 
Some unscrupulous employers will not openly violate IRCA and 
hire undocumented workers. However, some of them will hire 
independent contractors that hire undocumented workers.223 
Employers are not required to screen independent contractors in the 
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same way that the employers must screen regular employees,224 but 
an employer is prohibited from hiring an independent contractor if 
the employer knows that the independent contractor employs 
undocumented workers.225 
After IRCA passed, instead of hiring undocumented workers 
directly, large agricultural employers hired farm-labor contractors.226 
This allowed the large employers to exploit workers while not 
bearing any of the burdens of IRCA compliance.227 Believing that 
they have found a loophole, many employers have greatly expanded 
their practice of hiring independent contractors to exploit employees 
since IRCA passed.228 From 2001 to 2005, the total employment by 
independent contractors increased from just 1 percent to 7.4 
percent.229 
By only punishing employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers through independent contractors, IRCA 
incentivizes unscrupulous employers not to investigate whether an 
independent contractor hires undocumented workers. If an employer 
takes affirmative action to verify the documentation status of an 
independent contractor’s employees, the employer is held to the 
reasonableness standard, the same standard that applies when an 
employer directly hires the employee.230 Thus, by requesting to verify 
an independent contractor’s employees, the employer opens the door 
to more potential liability. Therefore, by not requesting verification 
the employer absolves itself from this liability and is able to exploit 
the undocumented employees through the independent contractor. 
This rule regarding independent contractors has also created a 
large gray area for employers. Specifically, because IRCA only 
prohibits employers from hiring independent contractors if the 
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employers have knowledge that the contractors hire undocumented 
workers, what should employers do if they suspect that contractors 
hire undocumented workers but do not have knowledge of the fact? 
Is a law-abiding employer who ignores his or her suspicion now 
unscrupulous? Or, is an employer who investigates further deemed 
“anti-immigrant” because he questions the documentation status of 
the contractor’s employees? The potential for employer liability for 
hiring an independent contractor who the employer knows uses 
undocumented labor does little to close the loophole. It also creates 
more confusion for employers who want to follow the law but do not 
want to unnecessarily disturb their business relationships. 
B.  IRCA Enforcement Is Incorrectly Focused  
on Employees and Job Sectors Where  
Undocumented Labor Is Not Prevalent 
Although INS and, currently, ICE have declared that 
enforcement is focused on employers, the brunt of the law often 
impacts undocumented employees.231 The INS, in many past cases, 
actually ended up teaming with employers to find undocumented 
workers.232 After deporting the workers, the agency only rarely 
punished the employers.233 For example, in 2008, ICE made more 
than 6,200 criminal and administrative arrests related to worksite 
enforcement; only 135 of those arrested were employers.234 The fact 
that ICE will work with employers to find and deport undocumented 
workers sends a message to unscrupulous employers that the door is 
open to exploit undocumented workers and turn them over to ICE 
when the arrangement stops benefiting such employers. 
Not only has enforcement been incorrectly focused on 
employees instead of on employers but enforcement has also become 
focused on industries with national-security interests instead of on 
industries that heavily rely on immigrant labor.235 After the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the former INS focused its main 
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enforcement efforts on infrastructure sites such as airports, nuclear 
power plants, and military bases.236 However, the five industries that 
are most reliant on immigrant labor are agriculture; building, 
groundskeeping, and maintenance; construction; food preparation 
and serving; and production.237 Because these industries are usually 
not the focus of national-security issues, Congress moved resources 
for enforcement to industries and locations where national security 
was at issue.238 Thus, IRCA now turns a blind eye to the very job 
magnet that Congress enacted it to eradicate. 
C.  Recent Changes in Enforcement Have  
Little Effect on Unscrupulous Employers 
While the INS, and later ICE, primarily relied on raids, recent 
enforcement efforts are directed at employer audits.239 Although 
audits are becoming more commonplace, ICE admits that these 
investigations can take several years to prosecute.240 When choosing 
whom to audit, ICE does not randomly select employers; it bases 
“[a]ll investigations and arrests . . . on specific intelligence obtained 
from a variety of sources.”241 While the current administration plans 
to increase the number of audits, the 2010 fiscal year budget for ICE 
only had $6 million allocated specifically for worksite 
enforcement.242 That amounted to less than one-tenth of 1 percent of 
ICE’s budget for the fiscal year.243 ICE’s 2010 budget fact sheet 
stated that “[f]unding for worksite enforcement will allow ICE to 
provide a strong deterrent to employers who knowingly hire illegal 
workers; reduce economic incentive for illegal immigration; and 
restore the integrity of employment laws.”244 It is hard to believe that 
ICE could have accomplished these lofty goals with an average of 
$120,000 per state for the entire 2010 fiscal year. 
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Moreover, audits, or “silent raids” as they are commonly 
referred to, have largely been fruitless.245 For example, ICE audited 
400 companies, 110 of which had questionable paperwork, but ICE 
fined only fourteen companies for a total of $150,000.246 An audit of 
one California company found that 262 of its employees—93 percent 
of its labor force—had suspect documents.247 ICE did not levy any 
fines and did not criminally prosecute the employer.248 Thus, 
unscrupulous employers continue to disregard IRCA because audits 
fail to give those employers a reason not to. 
V.  GRANTING UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS  
EQUAL LABOR-LAW PROTECTIONS  
WILL REMOVE THE INCENTIVE TO HIRE THEM 
Because unscrupulous employers exploit undocumented workers 
to gain a competitive advantage over law-abiding employers, it 
would be rational to conclude that to eliminate this advantage ICE 
merely needs to properly enforce IRCA. While strict enforcement 
would arguably do away with the competitive advantage, and also 
deter illegal immigration, this is not a workable solution. Since IRCA 
passed, uniform enforcement has never been close to becoming a 
reality. Moreover, strict enforcement could bring about Congress’s 
original fear when it passed IRCA: that employers would 
discriminate against persons thought to be undocumented.249 Strict 
enforcement could also prevent cautious employers from hiring at all 
for fear of exposing themselves to unwanted liability. Policies that 
stymie job growth are ill-advised while the job market still struggles 
to recover from the recent recession. 
Because IRCA places enforcement power in the hands of 
employers who are ultimately concerned about their bottom-line 
profit margins, an inherent conflict of interest has opened the door 
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for employers to take advantage of undocumented workers. To solve 
this problem, Congress must take enforcement out of employers’ 
hands. In addition, Congress must ensure that, in practice, all labor 
laws give undocumented workers the same rights that documented 
workers have. 
A.  Repealing Employer Enforcement and  
Restoring Equal Rights to Undocumented  
Workers Will Deter Unscrupulous Employers 
Congress passed IRCA to control unauthorized immigration to 
the United States.250 This goal has undeniably failed. Even the 
original authors of IRCA stated, “we . . . believe that the 
shortcomings of the act are not due to design failure but rather to the 
failure of both Democratic and Republican administrations since 
1986 to execute the law properly.”251 Although the number of 
undocumented immigrants decreased slightly in 2010, experts 
attribute this drop to the bad economy and not to any meaningful 
enforcement of IRCA.252 Even though the focus of IRCA was to 
eliminate the jobs magnet, the lack of enforcement and conflicts 
between IRCA and other labor laws have encouraged employers to 
hire undocumented workers. While this has increased illegal 
immigration, it has also resulted in the creation of a competitive 
disadvantage for law-abiding employers. Congress must repeal IRCA 
and restore equal-employment rights to undocumented workers. 
While granting undocumented workers more labor protections 
may seem counterintuitive, it will remove any incentive to hire 
undocumented workers.253 Granting undocumented workers the same 
employment rights that documented workers have will take away the 
economic advantages that unscrupulous employers realize when they 
hire undocumented workers. If unscrupulous employers are exposed 
to the same liability that law-abiding employers are exposed to, the 
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unscrupulous employers will have no reason to purposefully seek out 
and hire undocumented workers. 
The Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) program established a 
similar system.254 Before it passed IRCA, Congress feared that 
agricultural employers would especially suffer because of their 
reliance on undocumented workers to harvest their crops.255 If 
Congress sanctioned them for using undocumented workers, 
agricultural employers would have labor shortfalls and their crops 
would perish.256 Congress predicted that labor shortfalls would result 
in, among other things, “loss of production of some crops, loss of 
sales to other countries, . . . higher prices for American consumers 
and loss of American jobs . . . .”257 
Congress concluded that the best way to meet agricultural 
employers’ needs as well as the undocumented workers’ needs was 
to “ensure[] that their employment is fully governed by all relevant 
law without exception.”258 Michael V. Durando, President of the 
Farm Labor Alliance, testified that such a system is “extremely 
effective” in meeting employer and employee needs.259 He said, “The 
fact that the system is so effective should not be surprising because 
what it does, in simplest terms, is employ the basic principles of a 
free market system—supply and demand.”260 By repealing IRCA, 
Congress could help eliminate the artificial desire for undocumented 
labor that IRCA created and thereby eliminate the competitive 
disadvantage for law-abiding employers. 
B.  Strengthening Government  
Enforcement of Other Labor Laws 
While repealing IRCA will start the process of restoring a level 
playing field to all employers, it alone will not be sufficient. This is 
true because unscrupulous employers would most likely continue 
violating labor laws. Thus, in addition to repealing IRCA, Congress 
should direct the funds that it currently allocates to IRCA 
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enforcement to increased enforcement of FLSA, NLRB, and Title 
VII. Moreover, the funds should be directed to the labor-intensive 
industries where undocumented workers are prevalent. 
The immigration enforcement budget is divided into three 
general categories: (1) border control; (2) detention and removal, and 
intelligence; and (3) interior investigations, which includes 
investigations on employers.261 Interior investigation spending 
increased 320 percent from 1985 to 2002, making up 11 percent of 
total enforcement spending during that period.262 As of 2002, the 
interior enforcement budget totaled $458 million.263 This is a 
significant amount of money, which, if directed at labor-intensive 
industries, would help the government ensure proper enforcement of 
all labor laws and restore employers to a level playing field. 
C.  Consequences of This Proposal 
Repealing IRCA and ensuring that undocumented workers have 
access to all labor-law protections will no doubt cause many negative 
consequences. However, the sum of the consequences is outweighed 
by the benefits not only to employers but also to undocumented 
workers. 
1.  Effects on Jobs 
Because employers will have to pay more for labor costs, this 
proposal could negatively impact low-skilled workers. To remain 
competitive in a global economy, employers may be forced to 
transfer jobs overseas. Because many manufacturing jobs are 
fungible, those jobs would likely go to countries where low-cost 
labor is available. For example, an American farmer who grew 
lettuce and broccoli in California transferred his operations to 
Mexico, where he pays his employees $11 a day instead of $9 an 
hour.264 Many farmers will likely follow suit to take advantage of the 
abundant workforce that is willing to work for low pay.265 
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The effect on service jobs would be different. Approximately 
30 percent of unauthorized immigrants work in service jobs,266 and 
the availability of these immigrant workers “keeps a damper on wage 
growth.”267 Thus, for services such as construction, food preparation, 
and other industries that heavily rely on undocumented workers,268 
repealing employer sanctions will likely mean that the price of goods 
will increase. 
But these jobs concerns are not legitimate because this proposal 
does not change the ultimate result that exploiting undocumented 
workers is illegal; this proposal merely changes the channel through 
which that goal is accomplished. Now, instead of enforcing 
immigration laws through employers and IRCA, this proposal will 
enforce immigration laws through existing labor laws. There is no 
reason to think that because labor laws will be enforced through a 
different scheme there will be a wide-sweeping, dramatic impact on 
jobs. 
2.  Effects on Illegal Immigration 
Although it may seem that granting equal rights to 
undocumented workers would draw more of them to the United 
States, the opposite is likely true. Granting equal rights to 
undocumented workers effectively removes any incentive that 
unscrupulous employers have to hire them. Eliminating these 
incentives will eliminate many jobs for unauthorized immigrants. If 
all employers are exposed to the same labor-law liabilities, 
employers will not have any incentive to hire undocumented workers 
over documented workers. 
3.  Effect on Discrimination of Immigrant Workers 
Because this Article suggests that there be stricter enforcement 
of labor laws, there is the potential that employers would 
discriminate against undocumented workers or workers thought to be 
undocumented. If employers are liable under all labor laws 
regardless of their workers’ documentation statuses, there is a 
potential that this proposal would tip the balance against immigrant 
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workers. However, these concerns are unfounded. This proposal 
seeks to place undocumented workers and documented workers on 
the same level. As this Article argues, a major reason why 
unscrupulous employers seek out undocumented workers is because 
the employers are exposed to less liability by doing so. Therefore, if 
an employer is not exposed to less liability by hiring undocumented 
workers, there is no reason for an employer to directly seek out and 
hire them. 
4.  Continued or Increased  
Demand of Undocumented Labor 
While this proposal has an indirect effect on unauthorized 
immigration in general, this proposal is admittedly not a silver bullet 
that solves the problem of unauthorized immigration. Even if this 
proposal were enacted, many employers would nevertheless prefer to 
employ undocumented workers even though they would be exposed 
to the same liabilities. However, this proposal is merely an attempt to 
eliminate the disadvantage that law-abiding employers face in 
enforcing IRCA. Controlling unauthorized immigration is a 
comprehensive issue and all facets of government enforcement must 
address it. This proposal would decrease the demand for 
undocumented labor from the inside-out, but, admittedly, Congress 
would need to take further action to solve the overall problem of 
unauthorized immigration. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court stated in Sure-Tan, and later restated in 
Hoffman, “[I]n light of the practical workings of the immigration 
laws, any perceived deficiency in the NLRA’s existing remedial 
arsenal must be addressed by congressional action, not the courts.”269 
Congress must act to remove the competitive disadvantage that law-
abiding employers suffer from as a result of not only IRCA and its 
lack of enforcement but also the case law that has followed and the 
subsequent dilution of undocumented workers’ labor-law rights. 
By taking the enforcement power out of the hands of employers 
and restoring equal-employment rights to undocumented workers, 
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Congress will effectively remove the incentive to hire undocumented 
workers. By removing any incentives, unscrupulous employers will 
not be able to exploit undocumented workers, and, therefore, law-
abiding employers will not be at an inherent competitive 
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